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I
n practice, resolving insolvent banks efficiently, particularly when they are very
large, presents a challenge that has been poorly met in almost all countries in
recent years. Insolvent banks have generally been resolved only at a high cost to
the country in which the bank is located. The costs are of two types. The first is trans-
fer costs arising from the use of taxpayers’ funds to reduce or eliminate losses to some
or all claimants of insolvent banks—for example, depositors, other creditors, and, on
occasion, shareholders. These claimants usually bear the cost of bankruptcies in most
nonbank failures. The second type is real costs associated with the misallocation of
resources from the often prolonged operation of insolvent banks; this misallocation
reduces a country’s aggregate income below potential.
1 Both types of costs are mag-
nified when reluctant bank regulators fail to move swiftly to resolve institutions when
they first become insolvent.
Ironically, such regulatory forbearance is motivated in large measure by a fear of
high societal costs from officially recognizing and resolving insolvencies sooner.
Depositors may perceive themselves as losing when legal closure and official recog-
nition transform unrecognized implicit losses into explicit losses. They may also
experience liquidity problems if they lose immediate and full access to the funds
when the insolvent bank is legally closed. Borrowers may experience liquidity prob-
lems if they are unable to access their credit lines. Finally, the payment system may
be interrupted. It is widely feared that the effects of these problems may spill over
beyond the banks and have adverse consequences for the economy as a whole.
This article examines the efficiency of the resolution process for foreign-owned
banks and considers whether host country regulators face additional potential prob-
lems when these institutions experience financial difficulties. As Lastra (2004) has
noted, banking is becoming increasingly international, but prudential regulation and
insolvency resolution have remained national. This article concludes that the problems
resulting from this international/national dichotomy in foreign-owned bank resolution
Bank Crisis Resolution and
Foreign-Owned Banks
ROBERT A. EISENBEIS AND GEORGE G. KAUFMAN
Eisenbeis is executive vice president and director of research at the Federal Reserve Bank
of Atlanta. Kaufman is the John Smith Professor of Banking at Loyola University Chicago
and a consultant to the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. This article was initially pre-
pared for presentation at the conference “Banking Crisis Resolution: Theory and Practice,”
held June 16–17, 2005, at Norges Bank in Oslo, Norway. The authors are indebted to the
participants at the conference for helpful suggestions and comments.
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA 2 ECONOMIC REVIEW Fourth Quarter 2005
are real and that their severity depends both on the size of a foreign bank’s host coun-
try operations and whether the bank operates through branches or subsidiaries.
Obtaining useful, timely, and accurate financial data may be difficult for a host country
regulator, especially when the foreign bank is operating through branches. But even
if accurate financial information were available, host country regulators’ ability to move
promptly to take corrective action may be hampered by the need to share prudential
supervision, regulation, and enforcement with home country regulators. These overlap-
ping responsibilities introduce the possi-
bility of delays not only in sharing relevant
information but also in legally closing insol-
vent institutions.
2
Additional problems arise because for-
eign(home) countries often provide deposit
insurance for branches of domestically head-
quartered banks in all countries and, in some cases, such as the European Union, are
required to do so.
3 Because both deposit insurance and resolution policies may differ
from home country to home country, the insolvency and receivership (“pulling-the-
plug”) criteria applied to foreign branches in a host country may differ depending
upon where the institution is headquartered. Potential resolution problems may be
compounded when a host country regulator deals with institutions from many differ-
ent home countries operating under different deposit insurance and failure resolution
schemes. These variations can result in differences in both the treatment of creditors
and in supervisory and resolution policies. For example, the payment of claims is gov-
erned by rules that specify when insured depositors at insolvent institutions are paid,
the office at which the claims are booked, when and how much uninsured depositors
and other creditors are paid, and whether the insurance agency contacts the eligible
claimants or the claimants have to file claims individually. 
Differences in supervisory and resolution policies also depend upon how strict
prudential sanctions are and how the closure rule is structured and enforced. The latter
affects how long insolvent banks are kept open and operating before legal closure takes
place. As the number of branches from different home countries operating in a given
host country increases, so does the possible number of different deposit insurance and
resolution systems that will have to be reconciled should institutions fail. Therefore,
large-scale foreign bank presence in a country could increase the potential confusion
both before and after one or more institutions become insolvent.
Finally, using home country domestic taxpayer funds to make deposit insurance
payments to depositors in other countries could, if nothing else, prove to be politically
difficult. Indeed, on occasion, the problems that arise in resolving foreign-owned banks,
particularly those involving branches, may be so severe that that cross border banking
in this form may be too costly to permit as a matter of public policy despite the well-
recognized benefits in terms of intensified competition and improved management that
may be associated with the entry of foreign banks.
4
We focus particularly on the less well recognized “dark side” of direct cross bor-
der investment in banks that may be encountered when economic times turn bad. We
also discuss the costs and benefits of entry in foreign countries via branches versus
subsidiary banks. To minimize the costs of bank failures, a four-point program is pro-
posed for resolving insolvent institutions efficiently. The article describes how the
program is designed to work in the United States. But the presence of foreign-owned
banks in a country may increase that country’s difficulties in satisfying the program’s
points. The article concludes by proposing a number of policies that may mitigate
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Large-scale foreign bank presence in a coun-
try could increase the potential confusion
both before and after one or more foreign
institutions become insolvent.these problems. Considering the issues involved before a crisis occurs is critical
because cross border banking in the form of foreign direct investment in banks is
growing rapidly as advances in computer and telecommunications technology reduce
the costs of operating both additional offices and across greater distances. Thus,
improvements in countries’ ability to resolve insolvent foreign banks more effi-
ciently and to lower the costs of bank failures would increase the likelihood that the
bright side of cross border banking will outweigh the dark side in both the long and
the short run.
Efficient Bank Insolvency Resolutions in the United States
A bank becomes economically insolvent when the value of its assets declines below
the value of its deposits and other debt funding so that the market value of its capi-
tal turns negative. At this point, the bank cannot pay out all its debts, including
deposits in full and on time, and its depositors and other creditors share in the losses
according to their legal priority.
These claimants may experience both credit and liquidity losses in the resolu-
tion process. Credit losses may occur when the recovery value of the bank as a
whole or in part falls short of the par value of its deposits or other debt on the
respective due dates. Liquidity losses may occur for two reasons: First, depositors
may not have immediate (next business day or so) and full access to the par value
of their de jure insured claims or to the estimated recovery value of their de jure
uninsured claims. Second, qualified borrowers may not be able to use their existing
credit lines immediately. Insolvent banks are resolved efficiently when the sum of
aggregate credit losses and aggregate liquidity losses, or total losses, is at or close
to zero (see Kaufman 2004b).
An insolvent bank may be resolved efficiently at the lowest cost to both the bank
claimants and the macroeconomy if the process employed by bank regulators in the
country in which the bank is chartered or licensed can satisfy the following four rules
or principles.
5 Each principle focuses importantly on the term “prompt”:
1. prompt legal closure when the bank’s capital declines to some prespecified and
well-publicized positive minimum greater than zero (legal closure rule);
2. prompt estimate of the recovery values and assignment of credit losses (“haircuts”)
to de jure uninsured bank claimants when equity is de facto negative;
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1. Caprio and Klingebiel (1999) provide a list of banking crises and their costs. Hoggarth, Reis, and
Saporta (2002) estimate that that the real costs of the forty-seven crises they studied amounted
to 1 to 20 percent of annual gross domestic product (GDP). Other estimates have been provided
by Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2001) and Kaufman (2000), who provide estimates of both real and
transfer costs.
2. Many of these issues have been recognized in a recent paper by the European Financial Services
Round Table (2005).
3. In some instances, host countries may also provide insurance for branches of foreign banks operat-
ing in the host country or may top off insurance if coverage offered in the host country is superior
to that offered by the home country fund.
4. The advantages are discussed in Barth, Caprio, and Levine (forthcoming) and Berglöf et al. (2005).
In New Zealand, the central bank requires an arm’s-length relationship between bank subsidiaries
in New Zealand and their parent companies (see Bollard 2005 and Reserve Bank of New Zealand
2004a, 2004b). These issues are also discussed in Borchgrevink and Moe (2004).
5. See Kaufman (2004a). Similar plans have been proposed by Mayes (2005) and the Reserve Bank
of New Zealand (Harrison 2005), among others.
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3. prompt reopening (for example, next workday), particularly of larger banks,
with full depositor access to their accounts on their due dates at their insured or
estimated recovery values and full borrower access to their pre-established credit
lines; and
4. prompt reprivatization in whole or in part with adequate capital.
The next section reviews how each principle is or could be satisfied in bank
insolvencies in the United States. We argue that the current U.S. system, while not
without flaws and not focused on foreign-owned banks, may serve as a useful model
for other countries in designing their insolvency resolution policies. The U.S. system
was developed largely in response to the widespread and costly bank and thrift insti-
tution insolvencies of the 1980s.
Prompt legal closure. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement
Act (FDICIA) of 1991 introduced a “bright line” bank closure rule that is triggered
when the ratio of book-value tangible equity capital to total on-balance-sheet assets
declines to a minimum of 2 percent.
6 If this ratio is not corrected within ninety days,
the bank must be declared legally insolvent, closed by the appropriate federal or
state regulator, and placed in receivership or conservatorship.
7 Its charter is revoked,
shareholder controlling interests are terminated, and senior management is typically
changed. If the institution can be successfully resolved before its market value capital
declines below zero, losses are confined to shareholders. Depositors and other cred-
itors are fully protected and kept whole, and deposit insurance is effectively redun-
dant. Thus, any adverse spillover effects, which occur primarily when capital turns
negative and losses are imposed on counterparties, are minimized. 
Because the closure rule is specified as book-value rather than market-value capital,
there is no guarantee that the institution will be resolved before its economic capital is
depleted or that creditors will be fully protected against losses. As a bank approaches
insolvency, book values tend to increasingly overstate market values for assets. Using
a book-value closure rule could result in de facto forbearance, so a market value–
based rule would be preferable.
8 Nevertheless, specifying a closure rule based on a book-
value capital ratio that is greater than zero provides some protection against losses due
to the deviation of book from market value and to errors in measuring asset values.
Legal closure that proceeds according to a well-specified, publicized, and credi-
bly enforced closure rule has several desirable attributes. It provides no surprises: All
players know the rules in advance and base their actions accordingly. It treats all
depositors and other creditors in the same priority class more fairly. Because banks
tend to have a larger percentage of demand deposits and other short-term deposits
and debt than other firms do, bad news, impending insolvency, or uncertainty about
how creditors would be treated in the event of insolvency typically increases the
incentives of those who can withdraw their funds to do so while assets are still avail-
able to satisfy their claims. Uncertainty thus raises the probability of a run, with the
initial runners receiving full payment and those unable or unwilling to run receiving
less. However, the presence of an enforced closure rule that would close a bank while
its capital is still positive would reassure claimants and greatly reduce their incentive
to run. All debt claimants, regardless of the date of maturity of their claims, would
know that their claims would be kept whole. Reducing the incentive for runs also
increases the time available for regulators to act to deter insolvency or bring about
an efficient resolution if the closure trigger is breached.
Banks become insolvent in the United States and need to be legally closed when
regulators are unsuccessful in implementing another provision of FDICIA—prompt
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6. Banks and thrift institutions in the United States are not subject to the corporate bankruptcy
code but to a special code in the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (FDIA). The bank act is consid-
erably more administrative and less judicial, considerably more creditor friendly, and potentially
faster in the declaration of insolvency ousting the shareholders and in-place senior management
and in making payments to creditors. Bank and financial holding companies are, however, subject
to the general corporate bankruptcy code (Bliss and Kaufman 2005). 
7. Two ninety-day extensions are permitted. 
8. While regulators in the United States may also declare a bank insolvent for a number of other
reasons, such as unsafe and unsound banking, they must do so when the closure-rule capital
ratio is breached. Wall and Eisenbeis (2002) and Kaufman (2004a) demonstrate that, on average,
institutions in the United States have been legally closed long after the market value of equity
became negative.
9. The exception is that institutions can fail because of fraud, which is by definition difficult to detect
under most circumstances. 
10. See OCC (2003) and Salmon et al. (2003). Kaufman (2004c) and Wall and Eisenbeis (2002) both
suggest, however, that losses in individual cases have been significant.
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corrective action (PCA).
9 PCA is designed to provide incentives for financially trou-
bled banks to turn around before insolvency. PCA established a series of five capital
tranches ranging from “well-capitalized” to “critically under-capitalized.” To discour-
age insolvency, bank regulators apply progressively harsher and more mandatory
sanctions on weak financial institutions as their net worth declines through these
tranches (see Table 1). The sanctions are
similar to those the market imposes on
firms in nonregulated industries. Sanctions
include change in senior management;
reductions in dividends; restrictions on
growth and acquisitions; adoption of capi-
tal restoration plans; and, if the bank is a
subsidiary of a financial holding company,
loss of its parent’s status as a financial holding company with the associated wider
range of powers (PricewaterhouseCoopers 2003). The tranches effectively serve as
speed bumps to slow a bank’s deterioration and to force regulators to become more
involved with the troubled bank well before insolvency occurs so that they may be
ready to close the bank legally when necessary and not be caught by surprise and
delayed. Thus, PCA effectively buys time for regulators to act efficiently. 
PCA also grants regulators some discretion to accelerate the application of appro-
priate sanctions and actions as a bank’s capital position deteriorates. This authority is
in contrast to the supervisory actions employed prior to FDICIA, when intervention
was less frequent or timely and discretion was often focused on ways to keep institu-
tions in business rather than on resolving them after they had become economically
insolvent. The pre-FDICIA policy tended to result in greater losses to both uninsured
creditors and the FDIC. 
While PCA has not prevented all bank failures, it has contributed significantly to
turning troubled banks around before insolvency and reducing both the number and
the aggregate cost of failures.
10 It is important to note, however, that PCA and a closure
rule at positive capital are not intended to prevent all failures. As in other industries,
inefficient or unlucky banks should be permitted to fail and inept management
replaced. But, because the adverse externalities of bank insolvencies are widely per-
ceived to be substantially greater than for other firms, such failures should occur only
at low cost with minimal losses to creditors.
Reducing the incentive for bank runs
increases the time available for regulators
to act to deter insolvency or bring about
an efficient resolution if the closure trigger
is breached.6 ECONOMIC REVIEW Fourth Quarter 2005
Prompt estimate and allocation of credit losses. Because regulators should
be scrutinizing a troubled bank under PCA well before the bank approaches the cap-
ital ratio closure trigger, they should in most instances be able to quickly estimate the
recovery value of the institution as a whole or in part upon it legal closure. If the esti-
mated recovery value falls short of the par value of the deposits and other debts, pro
rata losses (haircuts) should be allocated to these claimants in their order of legal
priority. In the United States, the FDIC has equal standing with depositors at domes-
tic offices and higher standing than other depositors and creditors.
11 The FDIC stands
in the place of the insured depositors at domestic offices and is obligated to cover
insured deposits in their entirety. The FDIC also shares proportionally in any losses
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Table 1
Summary of Prompt Corrective Action Provisions of the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991
Capital ratios (percent)
Risk-based Leverage
Zone Mandatory provisions Discretionary provisions Total Tier 1 Tier 1
1. Well-capitalized >10 >6 >5
2. Adequately  1. No brokered deposits,  >8 >4 >4
capitalized except with FDIC approval
3. Undercapitalized 1. Suspend dividends and  1. Order recapitalization <8 <4 <4
management fees 2. Restrict interaffiliate
2. Require capital restor-  transactions
ation plan 3. Restrict deposit interest rates
3. Restrict asset growth 4. Restrict certain other activities
4. Approval required for   5. Any other action that would
acquisitions, branching,  better carry out prompt 
and new activities corrective action
5. No brokered deposits
4. Significantly  1. Same as for zone 3 1. Any zone 3 discretionary  <6 <3 <3
undercapitalized 2. Order recapitalization
1 actions
3. Restrict interaffiliate 2. Conservatorship or receiver-
transactions
1 ship if bank fails to submit 
4. Restrict deposit or implement plan or recap- 
interest rates
1 italize pursuant to order
5. Pay of officers  3. Any other zone 5 provision 
restricted  if such action is necessary  
to carry out prompt  
corrective action
5. Critically  1. Same as for zone 4 <2
undercapitalized 2. Receiver/conservator within 
90 days
1
3. Receiver if still in zone 5 four 
quarters after becoming 
critically undercapitalized
4. Suspend payments on 
subordinated debt
1
5. Restrict certain other activities
1 Not required if primary supervisor determines action would not serve purpose of prompt corrective action or if certain other conditions are met.
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Systemwith uninsured depositors at domestic offices beyond the losses charged first to
other creditors and deposits at foreign offices. FDICIA requires the FDIC to share
any losses with uninsured claimants and resolve the institution at least cost to the
insurance fund. The only exception is when doing so is likely to “have serious adverse
effects on economic conditions and financial stability.” Requiring parties besides the
FDIC to share in any losses is necessary to minimize moral hazard excessive risk-taking
behavior by banks and to enhance market discipline by reinforcing the ex post at-risk
nature of de jure at-risk claimants. This requirement should, in turn, reduce the num-
ber of bank failures.
Prompt reopening of large banks. Liquidity losses to depositors can occur
when access to their deposit accounts is delayed or their accounts are frozen. These
actions transform demand deposits involuntarily into longer-term time deposits or
bonds. Liquidity losses also result when credit lines cannot be relied upon or drawn
down to meet business needs. Loss of liquidity thus impairs the efficient operation of
the payment system. When regulators close a bank legally, they often also effectively
close it physically, at least partially, until funds are recovered from the sale of assets
to start paying depositors on their claims. In many countries the lack of access to
deposits and credit lines is more feared than actual losses to depositors and gener-
ates as great, if not greater, adverse externalities. The more likely depositors are to
receive their funds promptly, the less likely they are to engage in runs.
Regulators often are unable or unwilling to avoid, at least briefly, closing banks
physically when they close them legally—for example, because of insufficient infor-
mation on depositors or recovery values. Thus, regulators are under considerable
pressure to avoid legally closing banks promptly. By delaying legal closure, regulators
temporarily avoid liquidity losses. But delay also postpones, at least temporarily,
explicitly recognizing underlying implicit credit losses and provides additional time in
which the bank may try to regain solvency and thereby avoid altogether the unpleas-
antness of legal closure. Evidence in many countries strongly suggests that, on aver-
age, such forbearance increases the costs in the long run over what they would have
been had the insolvent institution been legally closed promptly. To reduce the incen-
tive for regulators to forbear, FDICIA made prompt legal closure mandatory and, to
increase the efficiency of the resolution, required that it be at least cost to the FDIC. 
Liquidity losses may be minimized or eliminated entirely by legally reopening
the insolvent bank the next business day. Reopening would provide insured depos-
itors immediate access to the par value of their accounts, would give uninsured
depositors and other general creditors access to the estimated recovery value of their
accounts on due dates, and would allow borrowers to access their credit lines.
12
Thus, legal closure is separated from physical closure. 
Potential payments to depositors and other debt claimants, either directly or
through assumption of these claims by another bank, require an immediate sale of
7 ECONOMIC REVIEW Fourth Quarter 2005
11. Under the Depositor Preference Act of 1993, claims of general bank creditors, including sellers
of fed funds, and deposits at foreign offices are subordinated to deposits at domestic offices. See
Kaufman (1997) and Marino and Bennett (1999).
12. Fear of the adverse consequences of liquidity as well as credit losses have at times induced reg-
ulators not to give haircuts to uninsured debt claimants, particularly at large banks, after failing the
institution by revoking its charter and ousting shareholders and management. This practice is often
incorrectly termed “too-big-to-fail” (TBTF). The bank has already failed. This practice has proved
highly costly and inefficient. Losses tend to increase, and ultimate resolution is typically only
postponed, at which time losses are borne by the FDIC or the taxpayer.
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the bank by the FDIC or access to a source of funds. The FDIC may also operate the
bank temporarily through a newly chartered bridge bank that assumes most or all of
the failed bank’s assets and liabilities, generally at market values. The bridge bank is
either capitalized with equity by the FDIC or its deposits are fully guaranteed by the
FDIC during its operation until it is reprivatized.
The FDIC usually pays insured deposits at a failed bank at par the next business
day either through a transfer of the deposits to another solvent bank, which assumes
the liabilities with an offsetting financial
payment or, less frequently, through a
payout.
13 The FDIC can make such speedy
payments because it has been monitoring
the problem bank carefully under PCA and
has access to the bank’s records on eligible
insured deposits. In contrast, uninsured
depositors and other creditors generally
are given receivership certificates and are
paid in order of their legal priority as proceeds are received from the sale of the bank
assets. Unless there is an active secondary market for these certificates, uninsured
creditors receiving the certificates may suffer liquidity difficulties. To maximize effi-
ciency, these depositors should share in any credit losses but not suffer liquidity losses.
To help minimize liquidity losses, the FDIC has the authority to make advance payments
to these claimants on the basis of estimated or historical average recovery amounts
(Kaufman 2000; Kaufman and Seelig 2002). If payments are made at the time of legal
closure, this procedure is essentially equivalent to not having physically closed the
institution. Advance dividends also permit the estimated recovery value of uninsured
deposits to be transferred to a newly chartered bridge bank with immediate access
by depositors. In bridge banks, borrowers generally maintain access to their existing
credit lines, further reducing any liquidity losses. 
Estimates of the recovery value of the funds advanced as dividends tend to be
on the conservative side because the FDIC absorbs the loss if it overestimates the
recovery amounts. If it underestimates the recovery amounts, it makes additional
payments to the claimants later. The FDIC, in its capacity as receiver, can borrow the
necessary funds to make advance dividend payments from its corporate capacity,
which has access to the FDIC accumulated fund. 
The FDIC used advance dividends briefly in a number of resolutions in the early
1980s and early 1990s, when it did not fully protect most or all uninsured debt claimants.
But probably because most bank failures in the United States since the mid-1990s have
involved small banks and have been largely the result of major fraud, the FDIC has not
used advance dividends often.
Use of bridge banks and advance dividends to minimize liquidity losses, especially
in combination with the previous principle of preventing, or at least minimizing, credit
losses, should eliminate much of the fear of bank failures. It should permit efficient res-
olutions of large banks without strong negative reactions by the affected depositors and
having to invoke “too-big-to-fail,” which is now known as the “systemic risk exemp-
tion” to the prohibition on the FDIC against protecting uninsured claimants against
credit losses in bank resolutions. This practice permits the FDIC to partially or totally
protect de jure uninsured claimants in order to mitigate “any serious adverse effects on
economic activity and financial stability.”
14
Prompt reprivatization and recapitalization. FDICIA requires that insol-
vencies be resolved at least cost to the FDIC. This requirement also reduces losses
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While prompt corrective action has not pre-
vented all bank failures, it has contributed
significantly to turning troubled banks
around before insolvency and reducing both
the number and the aggregate cost of failures.to depositors at domestic offices that share the same priority and encourages rapid
sale of bank assets after legal closure. Reprivatization can be more difficult when
banks are publicly owned, including bridge banks. Public ownership of banks is not
always rooted in the desire to allocate resources efficiently. Nor do publicly owned
institutions necessarily seek to maximize profits. Rather, the intent may be to reallocate
funds for socially desirable or political purposes. Thus, when a government-sponsored
bank becomes insolvent, the government is likely to keep the institution in operation
regardless of its financial condition, and its return to solvency is likely to be slower.
The consequence is that losses are likely to continue, and the ultimate cost of resolution
to the taxpayer is likely to be larger than it otherwise would.
To minimize government forbearance and its attendant costs, insolvent banks
should be sold to the private sector in whole or parts as soon as this can be done effi-
ciently. Indeed, in the United States, the maximum life of a bridge bank is specified
by law to be no longer than two years, with three one-year extensions (which is prob-
ably longer than necessary). Moreover, the sale should be on terms that provide suffi-
cient private capital to ensure that, after adjusting for any guarantees to the buyers,
the resulting institution will attain, at minimum, “adequately capitalized,” if not “well
capitalized,” status, to guard against a quick return to insolvency. Again, because
under PCA the FDIC is aware of most pending insolvencies, it can begin the bidder
search process for most banks before legal closure and the actual bidding at closure.
As noted, larger banks may need to be bridged to give the FDIC additional time to
sell to the highest bidders without having to resort to fire-sale losses or otherwise
being forced to unwind the bank inefficiently.
Potential Problems in Efficient Insolvency Resolution 
Introduced by Foreign-Owned Banks
Several characteristics of foreign-owned banks can make it more difficult for host
countries to achieve some or all of the above four objectives for efficient resolution
of insolvencies of foreign-owned banks. The problems arise primarily because foreign-
owned banks are likely to be subject to more than one bank regulator, more than one
deposit insurance agency, and more than one insolvency resolution agency—the
home and host country entities—with likely different rules and procedures.
15 In addi-
tion, the bank offices in the host country are generally not fully independent of their
headquarter office or parent holding company in the home country and thus are not
fully under the scope of a single country. As a result, the potential for conflict and
confusion is heightened.
16 For example, who is the primary prudential regulator, and
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13. A recent survey of deposit insurance practices indicates that few countries (only about 15 percent)
pay insured depositors within three months (see Demirgüç-Kunt, Karacaovali, and Laeven 2005).
In large part, this payment delay reflects that the insurance agency has insufficient information
on the identity of the insured depositors and the amount of deposits insured and requires the
claimant to file a claim. In the United States, the FDIC generally has the necessary information
and typically does not require depositors to file claims. 
14. The systemic risk exemption is discussed at greater length in Kaufman (2004d).
15. See, for example, Garcia and Nieto (2005), European Commission (2005), Financial Stability
Forum (2001), Eisenbeis and Kaufman (forthcoming), and Goodhart (2005) as well as a number
of the essays included in Evanoff and Kaufman (2005). See Eisenbeis (2004) for a discussion of the
conflicts that can arise for regulatory agencies, especially in situations where multiple regulators
exist. See also Mayes (2004b).
16. Holthausen and Rønde (2004) and Kane (2005b) discuss models of imperfect information flows
among regulators.
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how does it regulate? Who provides deposit insurance and how? Who declares legal
closure and how? And who resolves insolvencies and how?
These problems can be exacerbated because it may reasonably be assumed that
regulators of all types operate primarily in the best interests of the citizens of their
own country and not necessarily in the best interests of the host countries, particu-
larly during bad economic times when
insolvencies threaten (see Mayes 2005;
Borchgrevink and Moe 2004; and Bollard
2005). At such times, home-host country
conflicts can become more serious and
move to the foreground and must be con-
sidered. The remainder of this section
considers some potential problems with implementing the four efficient resolution
principles articulated above in situations involving cross border banking, particularly
when foreign-owned banks operate in host countries through branches rather than
through separately chartered subsidiaries.
17
As noted earlier, foreign subsidiaries of parent holding companies located in
another country are either chartered or licensed by the host country, similar to
domestic banks. But foreign branches may or may not be chartered, licensed, or
approved by the host country. On the one extreme, the European Union (EU) has
introduced a single bank charter that permits a bank chartered in any member
country to establish branches in any other member country without further per-
mission. Branches of European banks, regardless of where they operate, are subject
to prudential regulation, basic deposit insurance, and insolvency resolution proce-
dures of the home country.
On the other extreme, foreign branches in the United States are subject to
national treatment, which is similar but not identical to treatment of domestic
branches, and must be approved by both the Federal Reserve and either the
Comptroller of the Currency or the state in which the branch is to be located. The
Fed will approve a branch (or any other foreign office) only if it determines that the
parent holding company is subject to comprehensive consolidated supervision by its
home country comparable to that in the United States. The branch is subject to pru-
dential regulation and supervision by the Fed and the other approving agency.
Except for a small number of branches established before 1991 and grandfathered,
foreign branches may not accept retail deposits (under $100,000) and their deposits
may not be insured by the FDIC. They may be insured by the home country. Because
it is not a separate legal entity, a foreign branch is required by U.S. regulation to
maintain minimum capital equivalency deposits (CEDs) calculated as a percent of
third-party deposits at third-party banks and may initiate prompt corrective action if
these deposits decline to or below the specified minimum. If an institution becomes
of regulatory concern, it may also be required to pledge assets of up to 105 percent
of third-party deposits at the branch. Because these requirements help protect third-
party deposits at the branch, foreign branches in the United States may be treated
not very differently from foreign subsidiaries when they encounter financial diffi-
culties. To focus attention on areas of greatest current concern, the analysis below
assumes primarily unrestricted cross border branching as is permitted in the EU.
Prompt legal closure. Prompt legal closure at positive capital according to a
prespecified and well-publicized closure rule requires timely, accurate, and meaning-
ful information and data about the financial condition of the bank. Such information is
more difficult for host country regulators to obtain or interpret for foreign-owned
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Obtaining useful, timely, and accurate
financial data may be difficult for a host
country regulator, especially when the for-
eign bank is operating through branches.banks. For branches of foreign banks, meaningful data apply only to the banking orga-
nization as a whole, not to individual offices. The Danmarks Nationalbank also notes
that “the EU regulator does not generally grant the authorities of the host country
insight into the risks associated with the activities of a branch” (Danmarks
Nationalbank 2005, 65). Moreover, a bank may be legally closed for reasons of insol-
vency only by the home country. Therefore, except for reasons other than insolvency,
legal closure of unlicensed branches is generally outside the control of the host coun-
try regulators. From the host county regulators’ perspective, the closure decision is
effectively outsourced. Different countries are likely to have different legal closure
and PCA rules and may enforce these rules differently. Some countries, such as the
United States, have special bankruptcy codes for banks, and others include banks in
their general corporate bankruptcy codes.
Home country regulators may be influenced in both the decisions to officially
declare a bank insolvent and on how to resolve the institution by the relative impor-
tance of the bank in its home country regardless of its relative importance in the host
countries. Regulators may act differently in both timing and enforcement of legal clo-
sure, as well as in imposing corrective sanctions, for a banking organization that is
small in the home country but large in the host countries relative to one that is large
at home but relatively small abroad or is large in all countries. As a result, branches
of different foreign-owned banks in host countries may be legally closed at different
speeds depending on the home country. This difference may affect both the size and
distribution of losses borne by depositors and other creditors at branches of banks in
the same country but chartered in different countries. The greater the number of
banks in a country that are chartered in other countries, the more confusing the sit-
uation is to both bank customers and regulators in that country. The closure rule and
its enforcement may be either more or less efficient in the home country than in the
host country.
Subsidiaries of foreign banks also present problems, but on a smaller scale and of
a different kind. The subsidiary is a legal entity that is chartered or licensed in the host
country (which is the home country for that subsidiary), and the host country has
jurisdiction over it but not its parent. Increasingly, bank holding companies are being
managed on a consolidated companywide basis. So while the data collected from the
domestic subsidiary relate only to the subsidiary, the data may still be difficult to inter-
pret for purposes of assessing solvency. For example, if the regulator perceives that
an insolvent, or near-insolvent, subsidiary may be rescued by a solvent parent, then
there may be less concern about an apparent weakness in that subsidiary. Conversely,
if the regulator perceives that a healthy subsidiary may have its assets stripped by an
insolvent or near-insolvent foreign parent, then it may be prudent for the regulator to
be more concerned about the subsidiary’s risk exposure. Indeed, in New Zealand, for
example, authorities have imposed constraints on large subsidiary banks of foreign
parents in an attempt to limit their dependence upon the parent or other affiliates out-
side of New Zealand (see Bollard 2005).
These considerations raise the practical question of when the host country reg-
ulator should legally close a possibly insolvent subsidiary and place it in receivership.
What is the probability that the parent will rescue a subsidiary bank by injecting addi-
tional capital or that it will not inject capital and will walk away? The decision
depends on a large number of factors such as size of the parent and the subsidiary,
the countries involved, and so on. (Some of these possibilities are summarized in
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17. Some of these issues were recently discussed in European Commission (2005) and Mayes (2004a).
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Table 2.) Should the host regulator move more aggressively if the parent but not the
subsidiary is insolvent? The parent may try to transfer good assets quickly to itself or
other subsidiaries in other countries. How well does a closure rule apply in such
situations? How should regulators react if both the parent and the subsidiary are sol-
vent but a separate operating subsidiary in a third country that provides critical services
to the subsidiary is insolvent and may not be able to provide the services? Finally,
some countries may mandate capital maintenance agreements that require foreign
parents to come to the rescue of their subsidiaries. But how enforceable are such
agreements across national borders?
Prompt estimate of recovery values and assignment of losses. Branches
are not separate entities, and their assets are part of the entire banking organization.
Thus, a host country regulator may have difficultly determining branches’ financial
condition. Because of interbank transfers, there may be little relationship between
the assets and the liabilities booked at a branch in a host country. Any branch may
have third-party assets greater or less than its liabilities to third parties. For this rea-
son, it may be difficult to estimate losses in branch offices, and such estimates may
not be very meaningful even if they could be done. Reliable loss estimates can be pre-
pared only for the banking organization as a whole and, at best, may be able to be
prorated to each depositor at each office. The promptness and reliability of these
estimates depend largely on the home country, not the host country. 
Loss estimates for insolvent separately capitalized subsidiaries are made by the
host country and thus present problems that are not significantly different from
those for insolvent domestically owned banks. However, last-minute asset-liability
shifting across borders in anticipation of insolvency, although generally illegal, is
more difficult to reverse than within a country, and the probability of solvent parent
assistance should be factored into the estimates. Regulators have a strong tendency,
however, to overestimate the probability of such parent rescues. As noted, parents
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Table 2
Likely Implications for Host Country Treatment of Foreign Bank Subsidiaries 
of Insolvent Parent or Subsidiary Banks by Relative Size of Bank in Country
Home country (parent)
Large bank Small bank
Solvent Insolvent Solvent Insolvent
Solvent NP RR NP RR
Insolvent PC* R R** R
Solvent NP RR NP RR
Insolvent PC* R R** R
Notes:
NP No problem
RR Reputation risk/asset protection
PC Parent choice of rescue or walk and resolution with asset protection
R Resolution with asset protection
* Parent likely to rescue
** Parent likely to walk
Assumptions:
• Parent bank likely to attempt to “repatriate” assets at foreign subsidiaries in anticipation of official insolvency so host needs to protect 
subsidiary assets.
• Abstracts from functionality concerns re computer/records/senior management availability for operating subsidiary as independent 
(stand-alone) facility after insolvency and legal closure of either the subsidiary or parent.







Small bankgenerally have the freedom to walk away from troubled subsidiaries and are likely to
evaluate each case on its own merits.
18
Prompt reopening of large banks. The timing of the physical reopening of
foreign branches in host countries is often in the hands of the bank’s home country.
Likewise, both the deposit insurance scheme for foreign branches of a cross border
branch banking organization and the rules
for resolving the branches of insolvent
organizations are often established by the
bank’s home rather than host country. If
so, this situation may lead to serious prob-
lems (see Borchgrevink and Moe 2004).
For example, the timing of the ability of
both insured and uninsured depositors
and other creditors to access their accounts and the value of their claims may not
necessarily be determined in the best interest of the host country. 
Deposit insurance schemes vary greatly across countries. Differences can exist in
account coverage, premium assessments, solvency, administration, and private or tax-
payer involvement. The speed with which payments are made to insured and unin-
sured claimants at insolvent institutions may also differ. The speed depends in part
upon whether the insurance agency identifies the eligible claimants for payment or
the claimants are required to file claims individually. In many countries, the deposit
insurer, be it the host or home country, does not have current or complete data on
insured deposit ownership and coverage. Thus, claimants need to file specific claims.
This method is usually considerably more time consuming and would delay prompt
reopening. (Some of these potential differences are shown in Table 3. See also European
Commission 2005 and Garcia and Nieto 2005.) Most cross country studies of deposit
insurance schemes have emphasized differences that affect the likelihood of solvent
banks becoming insolvent. In contrast, this study emphasizes differences after banks
become insolvent that affect the speed at which they may be reopened. 
Home countries may also encounter political backlash when they are required to
make promised insurance payments to depositors at insolvent banks in host coun-
tries, especially when the bank’s foreign operations are large relative to its home
country presence. Such cross border payment liabilities are effectively equivalent to
foreign debt. This problem may be particularly acute when some of the payments are
funded by home country taxpayers and the host country uses a different currency
so that the foreign debt also involves exchange-rate risk. Thus, in host countries,
branches of foreign-owned banks from different home countries may be physically
reopened at different speeds after being legally closed depending on the practices of
the respective home countries.
Importantly, the host country regulator may wish to see a legally closed branch
office reopened quickly, independently of when offices are opened in the home
country. But reopening a branch might not be feasible even if the host country were
to operate the office temporarily because the branch may not have “functionality”—
the senior management, the records, or the computer facilities necessary to operate
on a stand-alone basis (Bollard 2005). Thus, at best, some physical closure of a for-
eign branch might not be avoidable. If the branch offices in the host country are
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“source of strength” to their subsidiary banks and finance any losses that may occur from insol-
vency. This argument is not universally accepted. 
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Loss estimates for insolvent separately capi-
talized subsidiaries are made by the host
country and thus present problems that are
not significantly different from those for
insolvent domestically owned banks.14 ECONOMIC REVIEW Fourth Quarter 2005
sufficiently important in that country, the host regulators may be able to minimize
or avoid physical closure by requiring the branches to maintain sufficient redun-
dancy in these functional areas or to credibly guarantee immediate availability. But
such measures would increase costs and reduce whatever efficiencies might be asso-
ciated with branching.
In contrast to branches, subsidiary banks are separate, stand-alone legal entities.
The host country provides deposit insurance on the same basis as to domestically owned
banks and resolves insolvencies, so many of the conditions for prompt reopening are in
the host country’s hands. Nevertheless, as holding companies are increasingly managed
on a companywide consolidated or integrated basis, functionality may still be a problem.
The necessary management, records, and computers to keep the facility functioning
seamlessly may be at the parent or at another operating subsidiary in another country.
Thus, host countries may also wish to require as a condition of chartering a subsidiary
of a foreign bank that some redundancy be maintained domestically even though this
may reduce benefits that may be derived from economies of scale or scope.
19
Prompt reprivatization and recapitalization. Prompt reprivatization and
recapitalization of insolvent foreign-owned banks may be more difficult than for
insolvent domestic banks, especially to the extent that foreign-owned banks are
resolved at a higher cost (greater negative net worth) for the reasons discussed
above. There may be insufficient domestic capital, and a search for foreign capital
may take longer. A host country may also have difficulty reprivatizing branches of
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• Prompt correction action (PCA)
Declaration of insolvency
• Private creditors or government agency
• Insurance agency vs. other
• Closure rule vs. discretion (forbearance)
Insolvency resolution
• Administered by insurance agency, other 
agencies, or bankruptcy court
• Least-cost resolution (LCR)
• Insurer serves as receiver/conservator
• Too big to fail
Membership
• Mandatory or voluntary 
Powers of insurance agency
• Payer only






• Type of account, e.g., interbank
• Foreign currency deposits
• Coinsurance
Ownership
• Private vs. public (government)
Funding (premiums)
• Ex ante vs. ex post
• Magnitude
• Risk-based vs. flat
• Regular vs. “topping up”
Reserve fund
• Minimum magnitude
• Voluntary or required
Government support
• Explicit (official) vs. implicit
• Credibility of private funding (premiums)
Speed of payment if insolvency
• Insured depositors—to par value
• Uninsured depositors—to market (recovery) value
• Advance dividends vs. as assets soldinsolvent foreign banks independently of the actions of the home country. To do so
would require the regulator to seize the branch offices and supercede the jurisdiction
of the home country. Such seizure could delay the process and raise international
legal issues. Finally, there may be cultural and language differences that may hamper
a smooth and seamless transfer to potential owners in another country.
In sum, because of the increased difficulties in achieving at least some of the four
principles for efficient resolution, foreign ownership of banks may increase the cost
of insolvencies at such banks by increasing both the credit and liquidity losses in host
countries relative to the losses experienced in resolving insolvent domestically
owned banks. Higher resolution costs are more likely in cross border banking through
branching on a single-license basis than for banking through subsidiaries.
Possible Remedies for Foreign-Owned Bank Resolution Problems
It is apparent from the preceding analysis that the difficulties with efficient resolu-
tion of foreign-owned bank insolvencies lie primarily in the heterogeneity of both the
closure rule and the deposit insurance structure across countries. These difficulties
include differences in both provisions and enforcement; overlapping of legislation,
regulation, and supervision between home and host countries; and inherent incentives
for regulators to favor the welfare of their home countries, possibly at the expense of
the host country. These problems are complex and do not lead to easy or simple lasting
solutions. Moreover, they become increasingly significant as more and more banks
operate banking offices in foreign countries. 
Coordination and cooperation among home and host countries is a necessary but
not sufficient condition to solve the problem.
20 What appears to be required is greater
harmonization and homogeneity, particularly in closure policies and claims resolution.
Indeed, centralized multinational regimes for deposit insurance and insolvency decla-
ration (closure rules) and resolution, in terms of both provisions and enforcement,
appear to be the most promising way to ensure that bank failures are resolved efficiently
and without creating undue uncertainty.
21 Centralized regimes would eliminate the
differences that make multiple individual country regulatory regimes and cross border
enforcement and payments a severe problem. 
But such a system raises numerous questions: Which countries should be included
in the arrangement? How would those excluded be dealt with? How would the gov-
erning board be organized, and how would countries be represented on the board?
What authority and enforcement power would such a board have? What funding
would be available? And would the conflicts discussed above be eliminated by a single
structure or merely internalized and hidden from view? These issues are significant
enough that it is unlikely that a single, multinational structure for either deposit
insurance or insolvency resolution could be adopted in the near future. Nevertheless,
now is the time to begin the thinking process. 
In the meantime, how should cross border banking be operated? Is there an inter-
mediate or transition position that would encourage efficient resolution? A number
of countries—most notably the Nordic countries, where cross border, single-license
branch banking is scheduled to begin shortly—have established formal memoranda
of understandings on joint supervisory policies and agreements governing the treat-
ment of institutions in financial distress (Mayes 2005). Likewise, the major financial
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19. Again, New Zealand has made such attempts (Bollard 2005; Borchgrevink and Moe 2004). 
20. This issue has also been addressed by Danmarks Nationalbank (2005).
21. Kane (2005a) considers another alternative that involves the sale of options on insolvency losses.
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Central Banks and Finance Ministries of the European Union in Financial Crisis situations,” May 18,
2005 <www.ecb.int/press/pr/date/2005/html/pr050518_1.en.html> (November 11, 2005). 
23. This solution is currently preferred by New Zealand.
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public policy authorities in the European Union recently signed a Memorandum of
Understanding on Cooperation in Financial Crisis Situations, which was announced
in a press release, although the contents of the memorandum were not made pub-
lic.
22 But, as argued above, it is unlikely that such cooperation will work effectively
at all times, particularly not just when it is needed most—when a large cross border
bank experiences solvency difficulties.
Prudential regulators will have a hard time
not putting their own country’s interests
first and cooperation second. Moreover,
by not publicizing the details of the agree-
ment, regulators are not fully revealing the
rules of the game to all participants, whose
actions are thus less efficient. Adoption of
a common resolution scheme, possibly enforced by an independent multinational
enforcement agency by EU countries permitting free cross border banking, particu-
larly branching, may solve many of these problems. However, until a satisfactory
long-term solution to the problem can be developed, it appears to be in the best
interest of countries to limit physical cross border banking presence to subsidiary
banks even though such limitations merely reduce and do not eliminate the prob-
lems and may not promote maximum efficiency in the majority of times when banks
and banking are strong.
23
Conclusion
This article explores some special problems in the efficient resolution of insolvent
banks raised by cross border banking through foreign-owned banks and the forms
that expansion may take. We suggest that, despite the many gains that may attend
such expansion when times are good, potential problems may be both significant and
more daunting when times are bad and bank insolvencies occur. 
The article proposes four principles for the efficient resolution of insolvent bank-
ing offices against which to evaluate existing resolution structures for foreign-owned
banks. Some characteristics of foreign-owned banks can make achievement of these
principles by the host country more difficult. We conclude that the potential costs of
such insolvency resolutions in the host country, especially when entry takes place by
way of unrestricted branching, can be large not only in terms of larger credit and
liquidity losses but also in terms of the potential confusion introduced by different
closure rules and resolution policies across countries. In the absence of central multi-
national deposit insurance, a single insolvency resolution agency, and common or
harmonized laws regarding insolvency resolution and enforcement, we suggest that
entry by way of subsidiaries presents the lesser, but certainly not insignificant, set of
problems for the host country and its residents. For all forms of entry, resolution
costs can be most effectively controlled through the universal adoption of well-
designed and enforced PCA-type policies and legal closure rules based on market
values of assets and liabilities.
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marily in the heterogeneity of both the
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